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Reza Valizadeh, an Iranian American journalist and former Radio Farda reporter, was sentenced in 2025 to ten years in prison by Tehran’s Revolutionary Court. According to media reports and messages he shared from Evin Prison, the punishment followed his refusal to cooperate with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) Intelligence Organization. The proposal, as Valizadeh describes it, involved recruiting exiled Iranian journalists to return home under false pretenses and launching a media outlet aligned with the IRGC’s interests.
Sources close to Valizadeh report that prior to his arrest, the IRGC offered him financial incentives and a formal contract. The aim, he says, was to create a pipeline through which Iranian journalists abroad could be drawn back into the regime’s grasp — ostensibly through promises of safety and employment. He further stated that he was asked to share sensitive internal information about Radio Farda, including its administrative structure and staff identities. These accounts, widely cited in Persian-language media, indicate that his refusal to comply led directly to his arrest.
Shortly after declining the proposals, Valizadeh was summoned to a building in Tehran under the pretext of a routine meeting. There, according to the reports, he was detained and transferred to prison. His trial — described by his lawyer and family as hastily conducted — ended in a decade-long prison sentence, two years of internal exile, and restrictions on travel and political affiliation.
and here is the role reporters like @hommer_ich @schwerin_von play for Iran straight from the mouth of Iran's former intelligence Minister Ali Fallahian#Spiegel_FakeNews #Spiegel #FakeNews serving the Mullahs pic.twitter.com/nSTS6RS86i
— Zolal Habibi (@Ashrafi4ever) February 18, 2019
State-Engineered Journalism
Valizadeh’s case illustrates a broader pattern long documented by rights groups and opposition organizations like the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI): the Iranian regime’s systematic effort to engineer a loyal media class, often referred to as “friendly journalists.”
The regime uses intelligence operatives, foreign-based front groups, and manipulated correspondents to shape narratives that favor its geopolitical and domestic interests. These operatives often pose as freelance journalists or neutral observers while receiving direction — and sometimes payment — from Iranian state outlets such as Press TV. In one high-profile example, documents released by the hacktivist group Black Reward and reviewed by independent researchers showed that contributors to a pro-Kremlin American news site had simultaneously been paid by Iran’s Press TV, blurring the lines between journalism and propaganda.
These deceptive practices are not isolated incidents but part of a broader state-engineered architecture. The Iranian regime has long cultivated an international network of operatives and sympathizers who pose as independent journalists, academics, or human rights researchers. These individuals often embed themselves in Western media ecosystems, producing articles that echo regime propaganda while masking their affiliations.
In one particularly egregious example, Der Spiegel published a widely criticized article in 2019 authored by Luisa Hommerich that relied on sources from the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence (MOIS) and its front group, the Nejat Society. The article echoed long-debunked regime talking points against the MEK and was later challenged by human rights advocates and independent researchers for its factual inaccuracies, lack of balance, and reliance on regime-directed narratives.
The Regime’s Pen: How #Iran’s Clerical Dictatorship Uses Friendly #Journalists as Propaganda Assetshttps://t.co/TH8BUosNpJ
— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) March 25, 2025
In another documented case, the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) attempted to recruit a reporter from the Daily Beast website via the Habilian Association, a known MOIS front group.
One of the most insidious elements of this campaign involves impersonation tactics. MOIS agents have contacted Western policymakers and media outlets while posing as victims or disillusioned ex-members of the MEK. The aim is to plant pre-fabricated accusations and create the illusion of grassroots criticism, a tactic documented in reports by the NCRI and corroborated by cyber-forensics from entities like Microsoft’s Detection and Response Team.
The Goal: Narrative Control
Media manipulation serves several strategic purposes for Tehran. First, it allows the regime to undermine opposition groups abroad by casting them as fringe or dangerous. Second, it facilitates the export of disinformation to Western audiences, diluting international criticism and forestalling pressure. Third, by co-opting journalists inside and outside Iran, the regime attempts to give its narratives the appearance of legitimacy.
Tens of millions of dollars worth of the Iranian people’s assets and funds are spent on terrorism, demonization campaigns, and paying salaries of agents and the network of “friendly journalists, via Press TV.”#Iran #moneylaundering https://t.co/JNZnKMqd3F
— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) February 15, 2022
Iranian state media frequently amplify and translate content produced by these “friendly” journalists, further entrenching their reach. Articles published in the West that criticize opposition movements — especially when presented as objective reporting — are quickly recycled by Iranian state-affiliated platforms, giving the impression of broad consensus.
The regime’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) has been instrumental in this endeavor. Former Intelligence Minister Ali Fallahian openly admitted that many Iranian journalists operating abroad are, in fact, intelligence agents. This admission underscores the regime’s systematic infiltration of media outlets to control the narrative surrounding its policies and actions.
But beyond tactical disinformation, the strategic goal is to eliminate any viable alternative to clerical rule, particularly the PMOI and NCRI. The regime’s decades-long investment in narrative warfare against them underscores a central fact: in the eyes of the Iranian regime, the PMOI, and the NCRI is not just an enemy, it is the alternative.
Exposure of Website Aligning with #Iranian Regime’s Influence Campaign Demands Counteractionshttps://t.co/08A56QBYru
— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) August 20, 2024
Coercion or Co-option
For those who resist the consequences can be severe. Persian media reports detail how Valizadeh was pressured to participate in a forced interview, prepared by masked interrogator-journalists. He reportedly informed his family that the authorities may only be able to extract a sentence or two from the coerced footage for propaganda use. Valizadeh also reported being held in Evin’s notoriously unsanitary Ward 8, facing health risks and isolation, with his family denied the right to visit or secure legal documentation on his behalf.
Analysts suggest that the regime’s harsh treatment of non-compliant journalists is meant to send a message: there is no room for independence in Iran’s media environment. Either join the system — as a compliant amplifier of state narratives — or be silenced through incarceration and defamation.
The regime’s growing investment in the “friendly journalist” apparatus, as detailed by dissident groups and supported by cases like Reza Valizadeh’s, reflects a strategy not only of domestic suppression but of international manipulation. The Iranian intelligence system is not merely censoring dissenting voices; it is actively attempting to replace them with a curated media class whose loyalty lies not with truth or the public, but with the regime’s survival.