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The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s government in Syria has triggered a wave of reactions in Iranian state-controlled media and among officials, reflecting deep concerns over its impact on Tehran’s regional strategy. While the Iranian regime has maintained official silence, the defensive tone of its media outlets and the statements of lawmakers reveal a regime grappling with the strategic blow and its potential repercussions.
In the 24 hours leading up to Assad’s fall, state-controlled media in Iran noticeably shifted their language regarding Assad’s opponents. Previously described as “terrorists” or “takfiri” groups, these outlets began referring to them as “armed opposition groups” in the days before the fall. After the collapse of Assad’s government was confirmed, the terminology shifted again to “militias,” revealing a calculated adjustment in rhetoric.
The IRGC-linked Mashregh News, in an article titled “Iran and the Axis of Resistance After Assad’s Fall,” raised serious concerns about the future. “What will be the fate of the Axis of Resistance after Bashar Assad? Will it weaken?” it asked, acknowledging that the loss of a loyal ally in Damascus represented a “heavy blow” for Iran. However, the outlet suggested alternative strategies, stating, “Iran can strengthen parts of the Axis of Resistance, such as Yemen or other regions, to ensure this axis becomes powerful in other ways and maintain the balance of power under new rules.” It also hinted at possible military escalations, warning, “In Iran, changes in equipment and weaponry could fundamentally alter the rules of power in the region.”
#Iranian Regime Fears Collapse of #Syria and Regional Setbackshttps://t.co/NyZA7MWt15
— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) December 7, 2024
Fars News, another IRGC-affiliated outlet, described Assad’s tenure as a “mutual opportunity” for both Syria and Tehran. It lamented that Assad had failed to fully heed Iran’s advice, stating, “Iran used this opportunity to strengthen the Axis of Resistance and enhance governance in Syria, but Assad did not pay enough attention to Iran’s recommendations on democracy and popular defense.” The outlet sought to reassure its audience by emphasizing Iran’s capacity to regroup in other arenas. “In war, sometimes you strike, and sometimes you’re struck. What matters is using these experiences on other battlefields. The remaining theaters of this war—in Yemen, Iraq, Palestine, Lebanon, and even Iran—are still in play, and with divine determination and persistent struggle, we can ultimately achieve victory.”
The website Tabnak, linked to former IRGC commander Mohsen Rezaei, was more direct in highlighting the consequences. “The most critical impact of Syria’s changes is on Iran and the Axis of Resistance. After the losses suffered by Hamas and Hezbollah, Syria, as the logistical link of this axis, has now slipped out of control.” The outlet noted that Assad’s successors could take an antagonistic stance towards Hezbollah, warning, “Until now, Assad supported Hezbollah, but going forward, the Syrian government may become its enemy, affecting the power dynamics in Lebanon.”
Parliamentary reactions have mirrored these concerns, with lawmakers calling for urgent discussions. Tehran MP Hamid Rasaee demanded a closed session, stating, “Parliament needs updated and clear information on the region.” Mohammad Taqi Naqdali voiced rare criticism, noting that even the regime’s insiders are aligning with dissent: “Recent regional developments offer a lesson: we must focus on the essential issues of our people. Today, even the most revolutionary individuals are dissatisfied with our approach. When will we address the people’s economic concerns?”
#Iran #News: Khamenei Rallies Basij Amid Fears of Protests and Pressure to Change His Regional Strategy https://t.co/L6oe0jFAu7
— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) November 27, 2024
Reflecting on the broader implications, the website Asr Iran critiqued Assad’s governance while indirectly warning the regime’s leadership against a similar fate. “Some may say Assad was a victim of foreign conspiracies due to his support for resistance. While this is partly true, the reality is that weakened ties between the government and its people embolden foreign actors. If a state faces significant external hostility, should it not at least act wisely and treat its people with compassion to ensure its own survival?” The site concluded with a stark warning: “Ignoring the people, their views, and public demands is the gravest mistake a government can make. Assad did so, and it led his country to ruin and himself to infamy.”
Mojtaba Hosseini Dibaji, head of the Supreme Leader’s representative office in the IRGC in Markazi Province, addressed IRGC personnel in Zarandieh to boost their morale. He stated, “The recent advances of takfiri terrorists in Syria remind us of the MEK’s attack after the ceasefire, which was ultimately crushed in the decisive Mersad operation. By God’s grace, the takfiri terrorists will meet the same fate, and their plans will be annihilated.”
The fall of Assad has exposed Tehran’s vulnerabilities at a critical juncture. Despite attempts by state media to project resilience, their language reveals a regime deeply alarmed by the strategic and symbolic impact of Assad’s removal. The fear is not just of losing a key ally but of the broader message it sends to a population already grappling with economic and political discontent. While Tehran may attempt to regroup and shift the narrative, the cracks in its regional strategy and internal stability have become more visible than ever.
