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The sudden fall of Bashar al-Assad, accompanied by his flight to Russia with billions of dollars—a scene eerily reminiscent of the Shah of Iran’s 1979 departure—has unleashed a storm of political blame in Tehran. Iran’s ruling factions, reeling from the strategic shock, have turned on each other in a war of words that exposes deep fractures within the regime. As competing narratives emerge, the one constant is a shared focus: salvaging a regime increasingly out of step with its time.
In an editorial that lambasted Khamenei’s loyalists, Ham-Mihan questioned the regime’s insistence on its regional strategies. Quoting a senior IRGC commander’s remarks to parliament, the paper wrote: “We are not weakened; Iran’s power has not diminished.” Ham-Mihan retorted, “If Assad’s presence didn’t strengthen Iran, why would his absence weaken it? What exactly are these officials trying to prove?” The piece concluded with a sharp warning: “Those unwilling to learn from this colossal failure are doomed to repeat it, as the poet Rudaki wrote: ‘He who learns nothing from the passage of time will learn from no teacher.’”
The fallout has drawn broader concern about the regime’s future. On December 11, the state-run newspaper Etemad warned of the wider social implications, writing, “Narratives portraying Assad’s fall as a symbol of Iran’s failed regional strategy deepen public discontent and prepare the ground for new protests, pushing the country to the brink of explosion.” The paper pointedly reminded readers of past crises, such as the 2017-2018 protests that began in Mashhad, noting how quickly they escalated into anti-regime slogans.
Why #Syria’s Regime Change Shakes #Tehran to Its Corehttps://t.co/ADsRiQDtSW
— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) December 11, 2024
These internal critiques extend to questioning the wisdom of Tehran’s prolonged entanglement in Syria. Ensaf News posed hard-hitting questions: “Why was Assad’s survival deemed worth the devastation of a country, the displacement of millions, and the rise of sectarian and tribal conflicts? What did this achieve for Iran? And how easy is it for Tehran to extricate itself from Syria’s quagmire now?”
Other regime-affiliated outlets lamented the ineffectiveness of Tehran’s propaganda and intelligence apparatus. Jomhouri Eslami pointed to the failure of experts and diplomats, stating, “When analysts claim on state television that Assad’s fall is improbable, even as he flees to Moscow, it shows that our officials rely on sycophants rather than truth-tellers. When our ambassadors in Beirut and Damascus fail to anticipate major developments in their host countries, it signals an urgent need for a complete overhaul of our diplomatic framework.”
#Iran’s Regime Feels Besieged Amid #MiddleEast Crises and Internal Discontenthttps://t.co/QYriNI9qqU
— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) December 1, 2024
In another column today, the so-called reformist paper Ham-Mihan criticized the regime’s leadership for recklessness and incompetence, stating that such failures have jeopardized Tehran’s regional position. The paper suggested that Iran’s approach to its regional operations lacked sophistication. It argued, “Just as Iran has supported groups opposed to its enemies and even managed to bring a group like the Badr Organization to power in Iraq, others are doing the same against Iran. However, there is one key difference: these actions are rarely, if ever, openly discussed in political propaganda.”
The economic toll of the Syrian adventure has also come under fire. Hamdeli Daily highlighted the squandered billions, quoting figures as high as $80 billion, and contrasted them with Iran’s unmet domestic needs.
MP Mohammad Manan Raisi protested, “After sacrificing 6,000 soldiers and billions of tomans, Syria was handed over to the opposition in a single week. If this isn’t divine wrath, what is?”
