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The last week of November 2025 exposed something deeper than environmental and economic mismanagement in Iran. Fuel price hikes wrapped in technical language, schools shuttered across 15 provinces because of toxic air, UNESCO-listed forests burning for days without equipment, and parliamentarians warning of social explosion all pointed to a single reality: the state is losing the ability to contain the consequences of its own policies.
Individually, these stories might read as familiar dysfunction. Taken together—and voiced by the regime’s own media and lawmakers—they show a system that now treats every failure as a potential precursor to unrest.
On November 26, the government-aligned daily Ettelaat revived a sensitive memory inside the establishment: the fuel protests of 2017 and 2019. It warned that higher gasoline prices can trigger “widespread dissatisfaction,” with long-term poverty and pressure that “create the conditions for crisis” if another spark appears. The timing was not accidental. Just a day earlier, the cabinet of Masoud Pezeshkian had approved a third fuel tier: from December 6, gasoline purchased with “emergency station cards” will cost 5,000 tomans per liter, on top of the existing 1,500 and 3,000-toman quotas tied to personal cards.
#Khamenei’s Grip on Power Slips Amid Intensifying Factional Warfarehttps://t.co/98hGe6rQfg
— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) September 2, 2025
Officially, the government insists that cheap quotas remain untouched. But the design gives the state a quiet path to shift more consumption into the 5,000-toman channel. In practice, the poorest drivers—those with the least reliable access to their own cards or the most irregular fuel needs—will be pushed toward the costliest tier.
At the same time, another state-run outlet, Charsouq, acknowledged that the promise to phase out mazut, the heavy fuel oil blamed for winter smog, has “gone up in smoke.” As pollution forced authorities to close schools in 15 provinces, it noted that power plants and heavy industry had slipped back into burning mazut to bridge energy shortfalls.
The environmental damage is no longer theoretical. In the Hyrcanian forests of Golestan, a UNESCO-listed ecosystem, fires that began late October spread rapidly across at least five counties. Local Red Crescent teams and residents with improvised tools formed the main line of defense while high winds pushed new fronts through steep terrain. The state news agency IRNA confirmed six major fire centers.
#Iran’s Economic Crisis Isn’t a Mystery—It’s the Regime’s Legacyhttps://t.co/yTq2D6gXgt
— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) April 21, 2025
The deputy head of Iran’s Environmental Protection Organization offered a blunt explanation: “We really have no equipment, no manpower, no facilities… about 60 fire points remain active.” In the Majlis, one lawmaker chastised officials for referring to the Hyrcanian forests as mere “grassland,” linking that dismissiveness to the same neglect that has left major cities unable to guarantee breathable air.
Tehran’s air-quality index hit 200–236 that week, briefly ranking the capital among the world’s most polluted cities. Twenty-five monitoring stations reported “unhealthy for all” levels; none reported acceptable air.
The health system is feeling the strain. Pediatric hospitals in Tehran report a 20–30 percent jump in admissions, driven by influenza, COVID-19, and other respiratory infections, while the cost of medicines and visits has climbed to the point that some households are avoiding care.
Power, Water, and Economic Crises in #Iran Escalate into National Security Threats, Regime Insiders Warnhttps://t.co/a0LQAXfUbX
— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) April 10, 2025
Inside the Majlis on November 25 and 26, the economic picture sounded just as unstable. One representative compared the spread of foot-and-mouth disease among livestock to “another coronavirus,” blaming high feed prices and market “chaos.” Another said milk prices had climbed in five months as much as they typically do in fifty years. An MP from Sistan-Baluchestan described a province “burning in continuous drought,” accusing the state of neglecting basic food, currency, and energy management.
The water data are even more stark. The spokesperson for the Article-90 Commission told parliament that of 609 plains studied nationwide, 422 are now classified as restricted or critically restricted, up from 317 in 2013. Tehran now records land subsidence of about 31 centimeters per year, the highest in the country, as aquifers are pumped dry.
None of these admissions come from opposition media. They are the system talking to itself—and increasingly about itself. A state that once presented itself as the defender of “the oppressed” now raises fuel prices through fine print, burns dirty fuel to keep power plants running, leaves UNESCO forests to volunteer brigades, and warns that even basic drinking water in major cities may soon be unsafe.
#Iran’s Regime Fears Impending Social Explosion Amid Worsening #Economic and Social Criseshttps://t.co/h9e5afgF4l
— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) March 4, 2025
The regime can still close schools, deploy police, or temporarily quiet the streets. But it cannot legislate rain, refill aquifers, lower hospital costs, or persuade families that a 5,000-toman fuel tier is a neutral “technical adjustment.” This week’s events suggest something beyond ordinary misrule: a government watching the limits of its control come into view, and discovering that it can no longer separate environmental and economic management from the question it fears most—how long people will continue to tolerate a system that cannot keep the country livable.