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The Iranian Regime’s Calculated Use of Monarchists: A Political Decoy

Historical image of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Iran’s last monarch, departing from Iran in 1979, with a Vatan-e Emrooz newspaper page in the foreground

Three-minute read

On February 1, 2025, the state-run newspaper Vatan-e Emrooz published an article titled “Why the Monarchy in Iran Was Overthrown and Will Never Return?” While the piece outwardly criticizes monarchist movements, it ultimately reveals a deeper strategy: the regime’s deliberate use of the monarchy as a tool to maintain its own survival.

A Weak Opponent is a Useful Opponent

The article concedes that the Pahlavi dynasty’s remnants pose no real threat to the Islamic Republic. It openly states: “A weak and rootless movement like monarchism can actually help the survival of the Islamic Republic. This is the service the royal family provides to the Iranian people.” This remark is a striking admission of how the regime perceives monarchists—not as a viable opposition, but as a controlled and convenient foil.

The piece argues that Iran’s shift away from monarchy was inevitable, regardless of the 1979 revolution. It claims, “Even if the Islamic Revolution had not occurred in 1979, the monarchy would have naturally reached its end due to its inability to address the needs of society and global developments.” This assertion aims to reinforce the notion that the monarchy is an obsolete system, incapable of revival, despite monarchist efforts to portray it as an alternative.

Monarchy is an Artificial Opposition

Despite acknowledging the monarchy’s decline, Vatan-e Emrooz emphasizes how monarchists continue to operate, though ineffectively. It dismisses their influence by claiming, “Today, monarchist activities in Iran are mostly confined to cyberspace and certain circles abroad.” It further suggests that monarchists exploit public grievances for their own political ends: “This movement, which mainly takes advantage of economic and social dissatisfaction, attempts to present itself as an alternative to the Islamic Republic. However, the reality is that monarchists not only lack significant popular support but have also failed to gain traction even among the opposition.”

However, the newspaper fails to mention the Iranian regime’s cyber army systematically employing coordinated efforts to promote Reza Pahlavi and the remnants of the Shah as part of the regime’s intelligence strategy.

The article attacks specific tactics employed by monarchists:

  1. Nostalgia for the Pahlavi Era – “Monarchists create an idealized image of the Pahlavi period, relying on symbols and slogans of that time, trying to mislead younger generations who have no memory of it.”
  2. Framing the Monarchy as the Only Solution – “They attempt to argue that the only way to improve Iran’s condition is through restoring the monarchy, ignoring both historical realities and the fact that Reza Pahlavi lacks the capability of his predecessors.”
  3. Social Media Manipulation – “Pahlavi supporters, using the vast wealth smuggled out of Iran by the Shah, operate numerous social media accounts that repetitively push their agenda.”
  4. Exploiting Public Discontent – “Monarchists position themselves as saviors during times of unrest, despite failing to offer any clear plan for the country’s future.”

By highlighting the monarchist’s incapability of any serious political action, Vatan-e Emrooz reinforces the regime’s long-standing tactic: painting any opposition movement as either ineffective or as foreign puppets.

An Admission of the Regime’s Strategy

Perhaps the most revealing passage of the article comes at the conclusion, where the paper states, “Despite their lack of impact, monarchist activities can actually be an opportunity for the Islamic Republic. A weak rival is always a blessing for governments.” This is a rare and explicit acknowledgment that the regime benefits from keeping the monarchy alive as a controlled opposition—one that is too weak to challenge its rule but strong enough to serve as a distraction.

While the article harshly criticizes monarchists, its subtext is clear: they are not the true threat to the regime. In a telling remark, the paper states, “Even Iran’s adversaries have realized this reality and are now placing more hope in the terrorist hypocrites (the regime’s pejorative to defame the MEK) than in the monarchists.” The very act of publishing this statement suggests the regime’s greater concern over alternative opposition groups, particularly those advocating for an organized, modern resistance.

Ultimately, Vatan-e Emrooz inadvertently reveals the regime’s larger strategy—permitting a weak opposition to exist while aggressively undermining any genuine alternative. The monarchy, once Iran’s ruling system, has now become a convenient scapegoat, sustaining the very regime it claims to overthrow.